



I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me. 
—Ralph Ellison, The Invisible Man
Are rights once established and exercised, then inalien-
able? Does belligerent force of foreign nations alone disen-
franchise Original Peoples1 of those rights? And can those 
rights be viewed differently because the people in question 
were classified extra-territorially as flora and fauna or 
Non-Christians? We have new understandings today, and 
yet, the foundation of western law in the lands claimed by 
“discovery” still asserts exclusive interest based on violent 
enforcement of a race-based European doctrine. 
Perhaps we can take a new look at limits put upon Original 
Peoples by western law and how it was applied to Original 
Peoples in the past. We must take into account, how law 
was used in the age of “Discovery” to subdue the Original 
Peoples who inhabited the presumably “New World”. This 
article reviews the extra-territorial legal schematic meant 
to replace “savage” law by Anglo-Europeans and exercised 
as a Christian right to do so. I put forward that the absence 
of recognition of Original Nations’ own legal precedence 
at the point of first contact must be considered in contem-
porary judicial review processes; that there is a necessity 
to apply those practices in international law and on the 
1  I have used the term “Original Peoples” instead of other common terms 
“Indigenous,” “Native” and “Aboriginal” Peoples because they have specific 
meanings in English that in practical terms limit rights. This initiative hopes to 
expand Original rights and to construe legal and political understandings to benefit 
so-called Indigenous Peoples. In an effort to be inclusive and not exclusive, or 
allow nations that practice empire to define Original People according to their own 
interests, I use Original to define those humans who continue to own the deciding 
interest in the lands in their home countries.
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ground from where those rights spring. I argue for a new 
approach for accessing those inherent rights of Original 
nations by strengthening their own institutions and suggest 
an international basis to create legitimate standing for their 
own court of remedy. 
Come on a journey with me; put aside prejudices that Original 
Peoples have had to contend with from other cultures, and strip 
away the layers of descriptions projected upon Original Peoples, and 
especially those self-descriptions misapplied to their own identities, 
communities and fundamental understandings of their arrival in this 
“distant land of laws,” known by its foreign control. Ask yourselves 
about the “Fundamental” law that governs how we have all come to 
understand our “rights.” What governs the responsibilities we have 
to each other, our environment and our inherent right to continue our 
traditions that has preserved peoples for thousands of years? This is 
not a debate between imperialism and its colonial practices; rather it 
is a debate between free minds and colonized minds. Original Peoples 
have lived under the assumption that their prison door is forever 
locked, I challenge that status by declaring that Original Peoples 
have the key to open the prison door which separates them from their 
traditional laws, rights, and freedom. 
Where do Original Peoples go to fix what is wrong with their com-
munities? Why do they found themselves alienated from their own 
lands and environment? To whom do they turn? The courts, laid out 
for Original Peoples and explained to them as “impartial,” have been 
anything but balance in their rulings. Why did Original Peoples find 
themselves mischaracterized as “backwards”?2 Who constructed these 
courts and on what basis have they been empaneled? Original People 
are invisible people in these courts, not because their rights do not 
qualify, but because the courts refuse to see them. There is no substan-
tive difference between the Original institutions of civil society that 
2  “…for example, the characterization of non-European societies as backward 
and primitive legitimized European conquest of these societies and justified the 
measures colonial powers used to control and transform them.” Antony Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004 
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functioned in the Pacific, the “New World” before European contact, 
and the new courts of imperialism which were installed by force. The 
inability or unwillingness of western people to credit “savages” with 
functioning civil governments does not remove their existence. The 
difference between Anglo European legal systems and that of Original 
Peoples may not be so exotic. Precedence created by Papal Bulls and 
doctrines favoring one kind of title over another, or one kind of right 
over another, has been largely based on European creations of race. 
If we look at the question of Original Peoples’ land tenure, does the 
Original land title look so different from western instruments, or does 
the human possessing the title appear somehow strange to the viewer? 
I posit it is the human that is strange to western claimants who wished 
to dispose of or claim property free of costs from the actual owners. 
For example, Hawai’i’s title history, which predates its occupation, 
reveals a notable difference in its formation and standing. Hawaiian 
title was formed under an Allodial3 mandate specifically intended to 
protect against seizure of its title grants by one of the many military 
powers coveting the Hawaiian Islands. Hawaiians held a convention 
to quiet land title4 in 1848, known as the Great Mahele5. The Mahele 
should have adequately preserved title interest in courts of nations 
3  "All lands within the state are declared to be allodial, and feudal tenures 
are prohibited. On this point counsel contended, first, that one of the principal 
elements of feudal tenures was, that the feudatory could not independently alien or 
dispose of his fee; and secondly, that the term allodial describes free and absolute 
ownership, … independent ownership, in like manner as personal property is 
held; the entire right and dominion; that it applies to lands held of no superior to 
whom the owner owes homage or fealty or military service, and describes an estate 
subservient to the purposes of commerce, and alienable at the will of the owner; 
the most ample and perfect interest which can be owned in land." Barker v Dayton 
28 Wisconsin 367 (1871). 
4  Quiet Title Action -A proceeding to establish an individual's right to ownership 
of real property against one or more adverse claimants.
5  The Great Mahele was several conventions that assigned land title or Royal Patent 
grants. The land was secured in Allodium or inalienable title. All title was subject 
to a tenant farmer right derived from traditional understandings and explained with 
mosaic law. Known in Hawaiian as Ua koe ke kuleana o na kanaka, That right was 
the paramount law of Hawaiian land tenure and afforded any Hawaiian subject the 
right to cultivate any lands left fallow. As long as the “kuleana” or right was being 
used, no one, not even the King could remove the Kanaka [person].
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with whom the Hawaiian Kingdom had Treaties6 and which accepted 
Hawaiian Royal Patent Land Grants. 
As demonstrated in the defendant’s filing7 in Damon v. Hawaii 
1904, the Royal Patent Grants of the Hawaiians were: “something 
anomalous or monstrous.” This is the concept that was applied to 
Original title and we could assert is now translated into the term 
“Native title”. This new version of a defective title has been very 
successful in continuing the alienation of Original Peoples’ lands. Yet, 
the language that is applied by imperialism, as in “Native title”, does 
not have to be accepted by Original Peoples. 
In a number of early Hawaiian occupation cases, the adoption of 
Hawaiian Kingdom statutes by the territory of Hawaii were challenged. 
For example in Damon v. Hawaii, 194 U.S. 154 (1904) the Supreme 
Court of the United States found, that the Great Mahele of 1848, where 
the Hawaiian government quieted land titles and established vested 
rights such as basic title, fishing, common access, was upheld. In that 
case, title established by the Hawaiian Kingdom was not effectively 
dissolved by occupation. The plaintiff’s claim was to the fishing 
rights to the reef attached to his land grant and contained within his 
deed. American Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who 
delivered the opinion of the Court, wrote, 
“A right of this sort is somewhat different from those 
familiar to the common law, but it seems to be well known 
to Hawaii, and, if it is established, there is no more theo-
retical difficulty in regarding it as property and a vested 
6  In addition to establishing formal diplomatic relations with other States, the 
Hawaiian Kingdom entered into an extensive range of Treaty relations with those 
States. Treaties were concluded with the United States (Dec. 23rd, 1826, Dec. 20th, 
1849, May 4th, 1870,Jan. 30th, 1875, Sept. 11th, 1883, and Dec. 6th, 1884), Britain 
(Nov. 16th, 1836 and July 10th, 1851), the Free Cities of Bremen (Aug. 7th, 1851) 
and Hamburg (Jan. 8th, 1848), France (July 17th, 1839), Austria-Hungary (June 18th, 
1875), Belgium (Oct. 4th, 1862), Denmark(Oct. 19th, 1846), Germany (March 25th, 
1879), France (Oct. 29th, 1857), Japan (Aug. 19th, 1871), Portugal (May 5th, 1882), 
Italy (July 22nd, 1863), the Netherlands (Oct. 16th, 1862), Russia (June 19th, 1869), 
Samoa (March 20th, 1887), Switzerland (July 20th, 1864), Spain(Oct. 29th, 1863), 
and Sweden and Norway (July 1st, 1852). Furthermore, the Hawaiian Kingdom 
became a full member of the Universal Postal Union on January 1st, 1882.
7  Damon v. Hawai’i, 194 U.S. 154 (1904) The defendant was represented by 
Attorney General of the territory of Hawai’i.
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right…The plaintiff’s claim is not to be approached as if 
it were something anomalous or monstrous, difficult to 
conceive and more difficult to admit. Moreover, however 
anomalous it is, if it is sanctioned by legislation, if the 
statutes have erected it into a property right, property it 
will be, and there is nothing for the courts to do except to 
recognize it as a right.”
This right, this Hawaiian right, stands up and is no different in 
substance to any other Original title source coming from the beginning 
of time. Paper becomes just an obstacle to illegal seizures of land in 
this era of “Discovery”.
It is hard to find a comparable case to the American usurpation of 
Hawaiian vested interests, but looking into the history of the United 
States, we see examples that can speak to the prior rights issues. We 
see the U.S. legal precedence that French and Spanish law governed 
land grants in Louisiana after the 1803 purchase by America. Yet, all 
efforts of the new Louisiana legislature to repeal the “ancient” laws 
have failed, even to this day. How then do we assess the presence of 
the ancient laws of the Original Peoples that were also in practice in 
Louisiana?8 Were these ancient laws successfully repealed? 
When we look at the fundamental laws that created the U.S. 
courts, do we see an impartial view of the Original Peoples of North 
America? No. What we find is the American acceptance of rulings 
based on racism, theories of superiority or manifest destiny. In fact, 
in the recent United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation 88 Fed. Cl. 1,4 
(2009), the decision is firmly built upon doctrines of Discovery to aid 
American imperialism. This case decided that all Tribal nations’ rights 
were subject to the plenary powers of Congress and non-reviewable 
by the Supreme Court. 
The decision in Jicarilla is actually liberating for Original People 
because now the people can begin to assemble, create new precedence 
in law through our jurisdictions. This ruling may be construed to mean 
that Original Peoples of North America have exhausted all remedy 
8  The Chitimacha law was the law of the land before European arrival and is still 
active today. The renaming of Chitimacha country to Louisiana was an attempt to 
abolish law to establish colonial control. 
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within United States. What I mean by “exhausted all remedy” is that the 
U.S. Supreme court made clear that in the case of “Indian Law,” those 
who have placed themselves under that federal jurisdiction are subject 
to the whim of the ever changing U.S. Congress. Yet, the American 
Congress, by its history, can only be described as acting out a policy of 
genocide toward their Indian wards. Many Original People reject this 
control. The late Russell Means, when taking a position on the breach 
of the Lakota/U.S. Treaty, literally tore up the treaty and declared that 
the Lakota People returned to full sovereignty of their nation. 
In an effort to further mislead Original People, they are often per-
suaded that “special” descriptions would be more advantageous and 
powerful to them for maintaining their identity and compensating them 
for their injuries; that this separation would lead to swift and more 
effective change in their status. Original People do not realize that 
these “special descriptions,” such as “indigenous” or “Indians” may 
prevent them from possessing and activating their rights by asserting 
“ancient laws,” which were/are well known to the world.
Original nations know their people and their borders. There is no 
legal basis for extra-territorial jurisdiction. Kal Raustiala Professor, 
UCLA School of Law and UCLA International Institute writes, in 
the Geography of Justice, “Why is geographic location thought to 
be determinative of the constitutional rights of aliens abroad? The 
supposition that law and legal remedies are connected to, or limited 
by, territorial location—a concept I term “legal spatiality”—is 
commonplace and intuitive.”9 Professor Raustiala continues, “that the 
soil itself is critical to determining what constitutional rights a person 
holds”. I interpret this also to infer what Constitution governs those 
rights of humans living in a certain place.
Who makes the determination of spatial sovereignty? Original Peo-
ples can themselves exercise the universal understanding of the limits 
of legal reach of others imposing foreign laws upon them. In the case 
of Hawai’i, its Constitution was well known to America prior to and 
at the time of occupation. After occupation, the Americans adopted 
the Fundamental Laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom as the legal basis 
9  “The Geography of Justice,”Kal Raustiala, University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA)—School of Law, Fordham Law Review, 2005, page no. 4
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for their provisional government and “state.” Yet, Hawaiians cannot 
easily recognize or access the very rights they have always held. 
In the wider Pacific, various imperialistic constructions of rights 
were imposed and applied to Pacific Peoples, all of which contain 
limitations. In Aotearoa, the interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi is 
enforced and implemented by non-Maori people. Although this Treaty 
“appears” to be more favorable to Maori rights than the legal situation 
in Australia with Aboriginal peoples, land grabs continue in a never 
ending attempt to squash real sovereignty. In the case of sovereign 
Nauru, its history contains an almost total destruction of its Pleasant 
Island by its literal removal as a result of phosphate mining begun 
during German possession and continued under Australian trustee-
ship10. The continued degrading treatment of the Nauruan People is 
still controlled by Australia and her hold on the islands’ economics. 
Our Sovereignty
“Referendum?! Constitution?! That mob that handed the paper to 
the government do not represent me, my family or my community. 
I am an Aboriginal man of five nations and I have never ceded any 
degree of my national sovereignty to the British crown. My lands 
were invaded and then occupied by force of arms. The British have 
carried out a horrific war of genocide against our peoples since 1788. 
I will never surrender to the enemy and I will continue to fight for 
justice until the day I die. Onetime !!”11 
What is the articulation of sovereignty? Western thinkers appear to 
believe that the definition of sovereignty is still up for debate, which 
may create a vacuum we can fill with a straight forward approach. 
The idea of sovereignty is that of rights given by the creator and the 
creator placed certain peoples in certain lands we can know as the 
“owners.” These are the Original People of those lands who hold the 
10  The trusteeship of Nauru was mandated by the United Nations in 1947 to the 
original trust administrators of England, New Zealand and Australia. New Zealand 
and England have long since accepted the Australians as taking sole responsibility 
for the rehabilitation of the island. 
11  Sam Watson, Aboriginal community worker & activist, FaceBook January 15, 
2012
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Allodium Absolute or inalienable rights to care for the land. History 
shows that belligerent military invasion does not erase sovereignty, 
and the countries subscribing to the “Law of Nations” doctrine have 
limited their ability to make legal claims of colonization.12 As such, 
sovereignty can be an effective tool that articulates a level playing 
field when determining who owns what right. 
“Furthermore, if sovereignty is so intimately connected 
with the problem of cultural difference, and if it is explicitly 
shaped in such a manner as to empower certain cultures 
while suppressing others, vital questions must arise as to 
whether and how sovereignty may be utilized by these sup-
pressed cultures for their own purposes.”13 
The misapplication of identity and rights:
How do we define “allegiance,” “protection” and “reciprocity” as it 
applies to Original Peoples? Taken from common law, these concepts 
easily fit Original Peoples’ understanding of their own identity and 
rights. The defining and use of allegiance, protection and reciprocity 
existed in the nearly three hundred year relationship with settlers from 
Europe in North America. However, in 1823, this completely changed 
with a ruling in one case that has singularly effected legal jurisprudence 
in common law, as applied to land title of Original People…Johnson 
v. McIntosh14, 
Decided in 1823, the implications of the ruling in Johnson v. 
McIntosh reach far beyond American shores and are cited to legitimize 
imperialism by all common law colonial powers. The decision, 
however, was rendered without due process or notice to the essential 
12  Emer de Vattel (25 April 1714 – 28 December 1767) Law of Nations 
,1758.”The Law of Nations is the science which teaches the rights subsisting 
between nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to those rights.”
13  Antony Anghie, Laws of the Postcolonial-edited by Eve Darian-Smith, Peter 
Fitzpatrick, University of Michigan Press 1999, p. 104 
14  Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) From Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion "that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects it 
was made, against all other European governments [which] necessarily gave to the 
nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives."
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party, the original land owners themselves, who, as a result, were not 
represented in the case. The dispute was between two land claimants 
who claimed to have acquired title from individual Indian15 sellers prior 
to the American Revolution. Each claimant sought U.S. recognition 
of their title purchased from the Piankeshaw16 tribe under the British 
domain in 1773 and 1775. The U.S. Supreme Court, led by Chief 
Justice Marshall found that Indian land title is subject to the Doctrine 
of Discovery and therefore, alienable by acts of U.S. legislation. Yet, 
the Court further ruled that individual Indians did not hold land title, 
but rather only tribes, as an “entity,” could hold title. The court ruled 
that possession of land was with limited sovereignty, only.
One question not often articulated is, “Who is the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Johnson v. McIntosh?” In the absence of the 
original land owners’ participation in this case, we can only conclude 
that the Supreme Court, in a practical sense, represents McIntosh and 
then rules in the state’s interest. The ruling effectively opened up huge 
tracks of land for uncompensated alienation. The seizure of Indian land 
rested on the ability of the United States to be the sole interpreter of 
law. The disenfranchisement of the Indians’ vested rights did not affect 
colonial titles; in effect, the Supreme Court ruled that rights could be 
recognized as per race. This was a clear violation of U.S. Fourteenth 
amendment of equal protection under the law of 1863, which should 
have annulled the 1823 Johnson v. McIntosh ruling, but did not. 
The United States’ intentional separation of peoples’ legal status, 
when under a claim of U.S. jurisdiction, resulted in an unequal 
application of rights so as to complete the U.S. policy of land seizure 
by discovery. Today, “special” descriptions are the modern day 
enforcement and continuation of the Johnson v. McIntosh ruling. 
15  The use of the word “Indian” reflects colonial context. Original Peoples’ self-
description is by traditional application and by many other real names. Thus, when 
referenced as Indians it is to be taken as “so-called.”
16 The Piankeshaw (or Piankashaw) Indians were Original Peoples, and members 
of the Miami tribe who lived apart from the rest of the Miami nation. They lived in 
an area that now includes western Indiana and Ohio.
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According to the late Edward Wadie Said, 17 a Palestinian Arab born 
in the city of Jerusalem, a professor of English and Comparative 
Literature at Columbia University and advocate for the political and 
the human rights of the Palestinian people,
“All knowledge that is about human society, and not about 
the natural world, is historical knowledge, and therefore 
rests upon judgment and interpretation. This is not to say 
that facts or data are nonexistent, but that facts get their 
importance from what is made of them in interpretation… 
for interpretations depend very much on who the interpreter 
is, who he or she is addressing, what his or her purpose is, 
at what historical moment the interpretation takes place.” 
“…The dense fabric of secular life is what can’t be herded 
under the rubric of national identity or can’t be made 
entirely to respond to this phony idea of a paranoid frontier 
separating “us” from “them.”18 
Johnson V Mc’Intosh appears to be the first example of an extra-
territorial decision of an American court that confirms the policy 
of genocide still practiced today by the American government. The 
meaning and intent of the court decision are clear, as history attests, 
as the decision reduced human rights and became a judicial tool of 
piracy. The Americans violated their own tenants of law, because they 
held the superior military power and felt no need to honor treaties with 
“savages nations”. 
I suggest that the single purpose that the United States has continued 
to pursue in terms of Tribal Nation policies is to effectively subdue 
legal challenges by Indian nations aimed at exercising their sovereign 
rights. This ability to interpret statutes to the advantage of the United 
17  Edward Wadie Saïd Arabic:  Idwārd Wadīʿ Saʿīd; 
1 November 1935–25 September 2003) was a Palestinian-American, literary 
theorist and advocate for Palestinian rights. He was University Professor of 
English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University and a founding figure 
in post-colonialism. 
18  The Pre-occupation of Postcolonial Studies- Covering Islam, (pp. 154–155) 
edited by Fawzia Afzal-Khan, Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, Duke University Press, 
2000
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States has worked so well for America because the sovereign Indian 
nations have accepted the very tools of their dismantling by submitting 
to U.S. jurisdiction. Instead of the rights of sovereigns or even the 
American constitutional rights of citizens, Indian citizens enjoy 
neither to a full extent.
Johnson v. McIntosh was decided in the common law arena and 
seized upon by members of the club of colonial countries as a way to 
create limitations on the land rights of indigenous nations of which 
these countries intended to take possession. But, in the case of Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), it was determined that African 
Americans “were not protected by the Constitution and could never 
be U.S. Citizens,” which confirmed and continued the policies of 
imperialism. This decision had devastating consequences for its 
victims and yet, found a basis in American law for decades. Today, 
African Americans would no more subject themselves to the Dred 
Scott decision, than to a separate but equal assertion. 
So why then do Original Peoples apply Johnson V Mc’Intosh to 
themselves today? In other words, when accepting the American 
description as in, Indigenous or Native, terms which are federally 
defined to limit claims to lands, sovereignty and self-determination, 
you accept a less than human status. Yet, these terms and descriptions 
are actively marketed to Original People as a method by which they 
may “legally” access and exercise their language, culture and rights. 
The Johnson discovery rule has not only diminished native rights in 
the United States, but has also influenced the definition of indigenous 
land rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. In 1836, British 
lawyer William Burge cited Johnson v. McIntosh in support of his 
conclusion that a private purchase of some 600,000 acres from the 
Australian Aborigines was invalid as it was against the Crown. British 
land speculators, settlers, and government officials quoted American 
jurists in disputes concerning the annexation of New Zealand in 
the 1840s, and Johnson figured prominently in the colony’s first 
judicial decision regarding Maori property rights. Likewise, when the 
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existence and scope of aboriginal title was finally litigated in Canada 
in the 1880s, the Johnson decision played a major role in its ruling.19
Professor Watson points out how seamlessly the courts in New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada latched on to Johnson v. McIntosh as a 
basis for state land policy. It becomes a very convenient legal excuse 
to remove Treaty obligations, as the United States has claimed to have 
successfully done. The seediness of this process of outrageous greed 
cannot dictate any human being’s acceptance of its artifice. Implying 
that Original Peoples all over the world must continue to be subjected 
to such legal absurdities, is beyond contempt. Original Peoples have 
the fundamental right to reject slavery in any form and the persons 
described in the case were not the original owners of the land. 
So, one must ask, when considering a self-description, or description 
to the original society: “Exactly what rights are being accessed 
when Original Peoples describe themselves as Indian, Indigenous or 
Native?” An “Indigenous,” “Native,” or “Indian” self-description is 
designed to appeal to one’s pride in one’s heritage, but it is dangerous 
when applied to a legal process because these labels affect rights which 
are limited to the American interpretation as opposed to sovereign 
rights that come with independence. The reason the U.S. encourages 
Original Peoples to adopt these “titles” is tied to whatever American 
“entitlements” or “rights” a person can access in a claim as a ward of 
the State. The western use of chauvinism and ethnic pride is designed 
and utilized to confuse people, to steal one’s very language and allows 
them to be corralled into a misapplication of identity. The power is 
not in “special” rights or classifications defined by the U.S., but in 
the “same” rights, the rights that imperialists keep for themselves. 
The distraction of “us” and “them” prevents Original People from 
taking a seat at the same table as equals with the rest of the world. It 
dehumanizes the Original population.
“For the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, therefore, acced-
ing to their identification as an indigenous people would be 
19  Blake A. Watson, The Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery on 
Native Land Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand . April 1, 2011 Seattle 
University Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 507, 2011 
Blake A. Watson is a Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. 
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to implicitly accede not only to the reality, but also to the 
legitimacy, of occupation and political marginalization.”20 
Dehumanization and Violence
Dehumanization and violence are the two factors that dominate 
the experience of many Original nations today, which no amount 
of analysis of western jurisprudence will fix. The action of Original 
Peoples taking control of their lives, including the creation of their 
own judiciary, will make a difference for Original People today.
Do guns take precedence over clearly defined rights? The truth is 
that occupiers have no legal basis to impose a foreign constitution 
within the borders of an established nation. However, this does not 
prevent the enslavement of native populations within the occupied 
territories. Currently, the demand for and exercise of original rights is 
often met with violence and imprisonment. 
A simple remedy would be the removal of all legal applications 
that view Original Peoples as less than human and the end to appli-
cations based on doctrines, such as the doctrine of discovery. It is 
the western colonial assertion of dehumanization, combined with the 
willingness to employ violence that aids the continuation of western 
title in the world today. Today, the relations between Original Peoples 
and the militarized powers are undermined by threat and use of vio-
lence against the Original People. Violent threats should be exposed in 
Original communities and brought to the fore by organizations such as 
the United Nations with an insistence that they be rejected. Insisting 
on the unconditional removal of threats of violence by the military 
presence in the world, must be a mandate of the international commu-
nity and may be the only way to begin positive change to the Original 
Peoples’ nations. International Law, including universal human rights 
norms, demands changes to policies of dehumanization and requires 
an immediate repudiation of any doctrine of violence and threat of 
violence, including unlawful imprisonment, by the global community. 
20  “Hawai’I, History and International Law,” Mathew Craven , Hawaiian Journal 
of Law and Politics, page 2, Vol.1 (Summer 2004). 
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Jus Heredes
The Aboriginal tent embassy in Canberra, Australia, founded in 
the early 1970’s, proposed that permission was not needed to assert 
Original Peoples’ rights. In Hawaii, the constitutional monarchy was 
established at the beginning of her relationship with Europeans and 
functioned successfully for many years. Hawaiians (Kanaka Maoli) 
are waking up to the ability to return to their own self-governance 
by using their original constitutionally established institutions. Why 
hasn’t this been restored yet? The Hawaiian model is unique and 
can, in theory, pave the way for many other Original sovereigns 
to breathe the fresh air of equality and sovereign rights again. I 
encourage the planting of the Original flag back in their own lands 
and insisting on the rights that were (and are) well known for their 
quality of justice. 
It seems appropriate to offer a Latin phrase to propose a new doctrine 
rooted in geography and traditions: Jus Heredes or Law of the Heirs. 
For so long we have struggled with ideas of race, blood quantum and 
ethnic identities, which creates confusion. The main purpose of such 
ideas is to lead Original peoples away from the source of their rights 
by persuading an entire original people to accept descriptions and 
mis-characterizations to legitimize the policies of Manifest Destiny 
and its accompanying imperialism. 
My Winnemem Wintu [Middle River Tribe] friend told me he was 
part “white,” but he could not prove it. That was, of course, a joke, 
but inside a real sorrow. The only reason to attach rights to race is to 
remove all claims sooner or later. The only choice for Original People is 
to fully reject race- based laws. Such laws create havoc in communities 
around the world and have no connection on the whole with traditions 
of Original People. Original People simply have the right to ownership, 
not unlike the first world, in terms of heirs and successors. 
Jus Heredes can create legal equality today. The doctrine requires 
the legal examination of “title”, so that we ascertain the “break in title” 
in order to access a just remedy. Contrary to Johnson v. McIntosh, the 
court would have to artfully recognize the origin of peoples’ rights, 
not by foreign claimants, but by the owners themselves. Jus Heredes 
387INVISIBLE LAW, VISIBLE
solidifies the absurdity that lands rights in Aotearoa originated in 
Britain, or land rights in Hawai’i originated in the United States. 
Without Jus Heredes, a tremendous injustice is done to Original 
People who, themselves may be misled into believing that officers of 
State courts are knowledgeable about Original rights, or that there is a 
legal mandate that Courts recognize these rights. 
Jus Heredes also asserts that no person should be subject to 
doctrines that do not share rights equally among all peoples. Original 
Peoples have seen the concepts of western land ownership used 
against them. Europeans latched onto the idea “Indians” cannot own 
land, conveniently leaving the land “open for the taking.” Often 
Original peoples find themselves confined by the past, reviewing first 
contact, arguing against horrible genocidal acts from Columbus in the 
Caribbean to the English massacres in Tasmania. Too often, Original 
People define themselves by the injuries suffered and not by the rights 
that sustain them—rights that have always been in the possession of 
Original People and which can be applied by them today. 
Remedy After Realization
Original Peoples have gone to the foreign and imperial courts in their 
own lands in an attempt to preserve their rights and status. Original 
Peoples have not forgotten their traditional basis for adjudicating their 
own matters, and can easily assemble the necessary agreement on 
fundamental principles that will guide creation of their own court. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone 
has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible (Article 29(a)). This 
backdrop provides a basis for an Original Court of Remedy, exactly 
the same as European-based courts. The Original Peoples’ court 
would be a court that would address conflicts involving human rights 
violated by the government. 
Such a court could be modeled after the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) or the American Alien Tort Claims Court. It could 
review nation-to-nation disputes, violation of human rights and 
injuries created by cross-border complaints. The process would be 
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fluid and several types of courts might be formed: a human rights 
court, a court of claims, a court of criminal justice and an alien tort 
claims court. What would be actionable? Violations of sovereignty 
of nations, violation of human rights by any country against a 
person, violation of rights of countries, individuals or communities 
by corporations would come under their jurisdiction. Such a court 
could act as a higher court when basic rights have been violated and 
persons have exhausted remedies in their own country. The court 
would be established by the founding member nations in consultation 
with and full participation of their citizens. A convention of members 
to empanel the court and determine the elements of its charter would 
be a necessary step to begin. The constitution of the court would 
include the description of rights, guaranteeing non-discrimination 
among all human beings. 
Although some countries may question the validity of such 
courts, or want to dismiss the process as ineffective, they would be 
wrong. Original Peoples’ courts could easily equal the legitimacy 
of the ICJ and perhaps surpass its enforcement capacity. Member 
Nations could consider sanctions on defendants that do not comply 
with rulings. It could create a venue to address issues not settled, 
promoting peace out of chaos. It could fill a vacuum of law that 
cries out to be filled.
The court could promote a more sustainable environment for the 
benefit of the whole world. It could specify that all peoples have a 
legitimate legal interest in their lands, an interest preserved for the 
world’s benefit, accessible to them in the condition charged to them 
by the Creator and inherited by their forefathers. What is law, if not an 
agreement on what is right? It is a way to preserve what is right and 
to preserve peace, including the peace of the land. Original Peoples 
would know what their position, identity, and responsibilities are, 
and what needs to be done to correct and preserve the future of their 
beloved countries. 
Original Peoples possess their own sovereignty, they already have 
it. Original People need to utilize it regardless of the response from 
States. Original Peoples can mitigate negative reaction by being 
professional in their approach, but strong in their resolve: the more 
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they are opposed, the more steadfast they must become. After all, 
this is a matter of the very survival of Original People on this earth. 
Sovereignty cannot live inside a prison structure. It will only flourish 
with free people who exercise sovereign rights. 
“Let the echo of our song be heard around the world.” 21
21  The Echo of Our Song: Chants and Poems of the Hawaiians by Mary Kawena 
Pukui (Editor, Translator), Alfons L. Korn (Editor) University of Hawaii Press, 
1979 
